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Abstract 
In the institutional set-up of (economic) policy preparation in the Netherlands there is 
ample interaction between scientific insights and policy proposals. This Dutch “polder 
model” lays much emphasis on the social dialogue to come to an agreement on, and 
have public support for policy proposals. It was very much the idea of  Jan Tinbergen 
– winner of the first Nobel price in economics – to have a clear separation in policy 
preparation between (i) trying to reach consensus on the working of the economy, as 
formalised in econometric models; (ii) come to a compromise on policy goals between 
the various minority parties of the government; and (iii) rely on independent and 
undisputed data collection by an autonomous Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The 
aim of this separation of responsibilities is to guarantee, as much as possible, the 
scientific quality of policy preparation and at the same time to gain public support for 
policy measures so that implementation costs are kept low. This paper discusses the 
working of this institutional set-up, its historical background and the mechanisms of 
quality control and reputation which are essential for the interaction between scientific 
knowledge and policy preparation to remain fruitful.    
.  
Keywords: Economic policy, polder model, social dialogue, interaction between 
science and policy 
 
JEL-codes: E61; E66; H11 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the conference on “Quality control and assurance in scientific 
advice to policy”. Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Berlin, 
January 12-14, 2006. The author acknowledges useful comments by Henk Don, Johan 
Verbruggen and Jaap Woldendorp.  
                                               
∗
 Den Butter is professor of economics at the Vrije Universiteit, Department of Economics, De 
Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, tel. +31-20-5986044, 
fbutter@feweb.vu.nl..  
 2 
The industrial organisation of economic policy 
preparation in the Netherlands 
 
Frank A.G. den Butter  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ultimate aim of (economic) policy is to enhance social welfare. In an ideal world 
with perfect competition, no externalities and transaction costs, and with a perfect 
distribution of property rights, the optimal path of social welfare is reached 
automatically when all individuals maximise their own welfare. There is no need for 
co-ordination by the government as the market mechanism will do the job. However, 
the real world is not ideal. Various externalities, the provision of public goods and 
problems of distribution require government intervention. The discipline of public 
economics provides the theoretical foundation and practical solutions how to deal with 
these problems of market failure and redistribution of income and wealth. Policy 
prescriptions on the most efficient ways for governments to intervene and solve the co-
ordination problem at the macro level are widely discussed in the literature. Moreover, 
the problems of government failure, and of politicians and civil servants seeking to 
serve their own interests instead of the public interest of enhancing social welfare, are 
also subject of much academic debate. 
 
Yet, the (economic) literature has paid far less attention to the way the process of 
policy preparation is organised. In democratic societies, the final step for policy 
measures to be implemented is that they are legitimised according to the existent 
democratic rules. However, before policy measures obtain parliamentary approval, a 
long and often winding road has to be followed to come from the first ideas about the 
policy measures to their final formulation. To some extent, this organisation of the 
process of policy preparation is institutionalised in various procedures and implicit or 
explicit rules. There is an analogy with the organisation of production processes and 
co-ordination procedures in industry, which is described by the economic discipline of 
industrial organisation. Therefore, when considering the institutional set-up of the 
design and shaping of policy measures, we may speak of the industrial organisation of 
policy preparation. Apart from getting parliamentary approval for policy measures, it 
is essential that these measures obtain public support. Although parliamentary consent 
and public support are required in all democratic societies, there appear to be 
remarkable differences in the institutional set-up of the policy preparation in these 
countries. Obviously there is no one best “model” to come to policy measures which 
enhance welfare. 
 
This paper considers the organisation of economic policy preparation in the 
Netherlands. Here the model is often referred to as the “polder model” as the social 
dialogue plays a prominent role in order to obtain public support for the policy 
measures. A background for this way of organising public consent may be that in the 
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Dutch polders all inhabitants had to agree about the water management and division of 
costs. That is because they were all involved in the implementation of the measures. 
The focus of this paper is on the role of scientific knowledge and of quality control in 
the process of policy preparation. Formally there is a one way direction in the use of 
scientific knowledge by policy makers, but in practice much interaction takes place 
(see e.g. Den Butter and Morgan, 2000). In the Netherlands part of this interaction is 
formalised in the institutional set-up of policy preparation, which may contribute to the 
quality of the policy measures, but, as we will see, may also lead to a lock-in of ideas 
about beneficial policies. In such cases there should be enough room for outsiders to 
start a dispute on these leading opinions of academics and policy makers. So the main 
question for the industrial organisation of economic policy preparation is to find a 
good balance between on the one hand fixed procedures which guarantee a good 
exchange of ideas between scientists, policy makers and representatives of interest 
groups, and on the other hand much flexibility in order to avoid lock-ins and early 
exclusion of opinions outside the mainstream.  
 
The contents of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section gives an 
overview of the history of economic policy preparation in the Netherlands and pays 
special attention to the important role of data collection at the level of the state. 
Section 3 discusses the present institutional set-up of policy preparation in the Dutch 
polder model, which is much inspired by the practical elaboration of Tinbergen’s 
theory on economic policy. The working of the interaction between empirical analysis 
and policy making is illustrated in section 4 by the unique procedure in the 
Netherlands where the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Policy Analysis calculates the 
effects of the election programmes of the major political parties (see Graafland and 
Ros, 2003). Section 5 assesses the standards and mechanisms of quality control in this 
institutional set-up of policy preparation in the Netherlands. It considers criteria for 
quality and provides examples of the debate and controversy with respect to policy 
measures. In order to illustrate how the industrial organisation of  policy preparation 
can differ between countries, the organisation in France is compared with that in the 
Netherlands in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Early history of economic policy preparation in the Netherlands 
 
Today empirical analysis and measurement play an essential role in the debate on 
policy measures in the Netherlands. It is especially this part of economic science 
which dominates the policy discussions. However, in the 19th century the Dutch 
science had not yet developed a strong academic orientation towards actual 
measurement and experience. This had to do with the protestant background of the 
Dutch government where measurement and divine authority had a complicated 
relationship. So, natural philosophy and empiricism were to be accepted within the 
framework of essentially religious means and goals. First and foremost, measurement 
was intended to develop knowledge about the greatness of God. So this orientation did 
not provide much fertile ground to develop a taste for an experimental, empirical and 
quantitative mind. This disinterest in actual measurement disappeared only slowly and 
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partially between 1750 and 1850 (see Klep and Stamhuis, 2002; Den Butter, 2004). 
Yet, it were mainly private initiatives of individual scientists and practitioners, and not 
so much of the government, which brought about this change in attitude. 
 
Kluit and Vissering 
An early protagonist of actual measurement in the Netherlands was Adriaan Kluit 
(1735-1807). He was the first Dutch professor to teach statistics under that name. One 
of the reasons that Kluit started to deliver lectures in statistics was a price contest by 
the “de Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen”  (Dutch Society of Sciences) 
at Haarlem, which is a learned society founded in 1752, and which, in those days, tried 
to promote scientific research by posing practical questions. This learned society still 
exists and was granted the label “Royal” by the Queen when it celebrated its 250th 
anniversary in 2002. The question to which Kluit reacted was ‘What is the overall 
situation, both in general and especially with respect to the economy in our fatherland, 
and what are the reasons why our country lacks so far behind, compared to our 
neighbours?’. So it was in fact a quest for economic data which inspired Kluit to get 
involved in statistics. Kluit did not distinguish between political economy and 
statistics, and in his specification the state was the centre of attention. So in his work 
we are at the beginning of  the connection between the working of political economy 
(in Dutch: “staatkunde” or “staathuishoudkunde”) and statistics. In this respect it is 
noteworthy that in Germany political economy or economic political science was 
called Statistica or Statistik. This connection can also be traced back to the Italian 
word ‘Statista’ or ‘Statesman’, which has given the discipline of statistics its name.  
 
Although he was a lawyer by education, Simon Vissering (1818-1888) can be regarded 
as one of the main protagonists of statistical quantification of the state of the economy 
at the macro level in the Netherlands. He was one of the leaders of the “Statistical 
Movement”, a group of lawyers who dedicated themselves to the advancement of 
statistic, especially during the period in which the government did not take its 
statistical task very seriously.. Although Vissering was more quantitatively oriented 
than his predecessors in political economy, his ideas about which data are needed for 
the description of the national economy, are still rather naïve as compared to the data 
which are nowadays used to analyse the economy. In the course of the 19th century 
quantification came to play a more important role, but it was still Vissering’s opinion 
that qualitative information was needed to make the statistical description of a state 
complete (see Klep and Stamhuis, 2002).  
 
Descriptive versus mathematical statistics 
It is interesting to note that in the development of measuring the state of the economy 
(and society) in the 19th century no much reference seems to be made to the work of 
early “quantitative” economists such as Petty and King in the UK, or Keuchenius and 
Metelerkamp in the Netherlands, who are nowadays considered pioneers in national 
accounting (see Den Bakker, 1993; Bos, 2003). Moreover, there was still a large gap 
between the descriptive and mathematical statistics. In the latter discipline the Belgian 
statistician Lambert Adolphe Jaques Quetelet (1796-1874) was one of the protoganists. 
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In 1834 Quetelet was one of the founders of the London Statistical Society, nowadays 
the Royal Statistical Society. Morgan (1990) describes how, in the history of statistics, 
Quetelet’s statistical characterisation of human behaviour proved to be of great 
importance. He noted that individuals behave in an unpredictable way, but that taken 
together these apparently disorganised individuals obey the law of errors in deviating 
from the ideal ”average man”. Obviously this is one of the basic notions in 
econometric methodology, used in the evaluation of economic policy measures. So 
Quetelet can be seen as a first bridge-builder between the mathematically oriented 
statistical approach and the descriptive and qualitative-quantitative approach. 
However, Quetelet’s ideas did not reach Vissering and his people. It was only after the 
1930’s that, with Tinbergen as the great inspirer and teacher, a full integration of both 
lines of thought in statistics took place in the Netherlands. It is remarkable that, 
whereas these two lines in statistics had been separated for such a long time, from then 
on the Netherlands obtained the strong position in econometrics and applied 
economics that it holds until today, and that is at the hart of the institutional set-up of 
the polder model. 
 
Statistics as a public good 
Vissering and his people have played a major role in promoting that the government 
should regard statistical data collection as a public good and therefore should take its 
responsibility in collection these data. However, in the second half of the 19th century 
the government was very reluctant to take up this responsibility. Therefore, in 1866 
Vissering took a private initiative to compose and publish general statistics for the 
Netherlands. However, this large project has never been finished (see Stamhuis, 1989, 
2002). In 1884, when the Dutch government was still not willing to collect statistical 
data in the public domain, a Statistical Institute was established by these private 
people. At last, in 1892, after questions in the Second Chamber of the Parliament by, 
amongst others, the socialist member of parliament, F.J. Domela Nieuwenhuis, de 
“Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek”  (Central Committee for Statistics) was 
installed. Finally, in 1899 the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) was founded, which 
from then on conducts its task to collect independent and undisputed data for public 
use in the Netherlands. The Central Committee for Statistics still exists and has a role 
as supervisory board for the Central Bureau of Statistics. Its responsibilities were even 
expanded by decision of the Parliament in 2003. In fact, the lobby to have the 
government collect statistical data at the level of the state was much conducted by the 
“Society of Statistics”, founded in 1849, can be regarded mainly as an association of 
economists (see Mooij, 1994). After 1892,  now that the lobby of the society for data 
collection by the government had finally been successful, the main focus of the society 
became on economics. Therefore, in 1892, its name was changed in Society for 
Political Economy and Statistics. Yet it was more than half a century later, namely in 
1950, that the focus of the society was really reflected in its name which now became 
Netherlands Economic Association. Finally, in 1987 the Queen honoured the society 
by granting it the label “Royal”. So since 1987 we have the Royal Netherlands 
Economic Association, which is probably the oldest association of political economists 
in the world. 
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Micro versus macro data 
National accounts and the way indicators from national accounts are used in policy 
practice relate to the debate in the field of statistics, namely to the question whether to 
collect data at the micro or macro level, and consequently to the problem of 
aggregating individual data when these data are used to analyse the state of the nation 
as a whole. It seems that these problems were only systematically dealt with in the 
construction of modern national accounts with Stone and Meade as protagonists in the 
late 1930’s. In this respect Van den Bogaard (1999, Ch. 5) gives an interesting 
description of the long discussions between Tinbergen and the CBS on transforming 
individual data from budget surveys to national data on consumption which could be 
used in consumption functions of the Keynesian macro models of those days. In the 
1930’s consumption was still something related to individual incomes, classes of 
people and their social role in society. It was indeed only in the early 1950’s that data 
collection and statistical methodology to analyse data at the macro level, were really 
integrated.  
 
3 The polder model and the Tinbergen legacy 
 
The present institutional set-up of policy preparation in the Netherlands can, in a way, 
be seen as a spring-off of Tinbergen’s theory of economic policy, where scientific 
insights on how instruments may effect policy goals are separated from political 
preferences on trade-off between these policy goals (see Tinbergen, 1952, 1956). 
These ideas were, of course, very much inspired by the political and societal landscape 
in the Netherlands in the period between the First and the Second World Wars (see 
also Van Zanden, 2002,  for a broad historic perspective). In the years just after the 
Second World War, when Tinbergen designed his theory of economic policy and was 
active in the institutional set-up of policy preparation in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
society was still very much “pillarised”. The four main pillars were the liberals, the 
Catholics, the Protestants and the socialists. Each of them were represented by one or 
more political parties with implicit preferences on policy goals in their own, so to say, 
social welfare function. As they all are minority parties, there has been always a need 
for the formation of a coalition government. The foreman of the political parties or 
pillars did realise that it is impossible to meet all of their own policy goals in such a 
coalition government. Although the pillarised society has changed very much since 
then and there has been a steady “depillarasation”, still all parties are minority parties, 
even more so then before, so that the need for a compromise agreement for the 
coalition government has remained.  
 
As will be elaborated below the analysis of  the Dutch Central Planning Bureau  has 
from its start played an important role in the design of the policy preparation in the 
Netherlands. Nowadays the bureau calls itself CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis, because there is no true “planning” involved in the activities of the 
bureau. More specifically the analysis is an important input for the negotiations and 
social dialogue on policy issues in what has become known as the Dutch polder model. 
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As Tinbergen, who was the CPB’s first director in the period 1945-1955, has built the 
first econometric policy model (Tinbergen, 1936), it is understandable that model 
based policy analysis has, from the origin, constituted an important part of the work of 
the CPB. The CPB’s ‘model’ early acquired a high status in academic circles and has 
come to be regarded in Dutch society as a more or less “objective” piece of economic 
science (Den Butter and Morgan, 1998). However, in the first few years of the CPB 
there was a fierce internal discussion in the CPB about the way the bureau should give 
shape to its advices (see Van den Bogaard, 1998). On the one side was Van Cleeff, 
who had the view that the CPB should follow a normative approach, while on the other 
side Tinbergen supported the idea of disentangling the positive and normative 
elements of the analyses. Crucial in this controversy was in which way economic 
policy advice would be the most successful in the pillarised economy. Van Cleeff tried 
to develop an all-embracing normative theory which would integrate the ideas of the 
different pillars. Like in industry that would lead to formal policy “plan” which could 
be implemented by the government in a co-ordinated effort of all citizens, On the other 
hand, Tinbergen wanted to develop a method that would give the most objective 
description of reality. The differences between the pillars would then be minimised to 
their different normative proportions. In other words, he wanted to make a clear 
distinction between the workings of the economy (model) and the policy goals 
(welfare functions), and then “try to agree on the first and compromise on the second 
issue". Tinbergen won this battle. Since then, economic policy preparation in the 
Netherlands is organised in three autonomous parts: data, model and norms. As 
discussed in the previous section, the data and statistics are collected by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in an independent and (hopefully) undisputed manner , the 
workings of the economy are described by the models of the CPB and the balancing of 
different points of view is done by the government in dialogue with unions, employer 
organisations and other associations of organised interest. This method of splitting 
facts and politics has, up to now always been a prominent feature in creating consensus 
in the Dutch society where all belong to a cultural minority or minority party. 
 
Many organisations and stakeholders are involved in this institutional set-up of the 
social dialogue in the Netherlands. Below we discuss the influence and working of two 
institutions more thoroughly. The first is the Central Planning Bureau that is to provide 
a quantitative analysis of the state of the Dutch economy, based on scientific 
knowledge, and that tries to establish a consensus view on economic developments and 
the effects of policy measures. The second is the Social Economic Council (SER) that 
plays (together with the Foundation of Labour) the central role in negotiations between 
the various stakeholders to come to a compromise agreement on matters of economic 
and social policy (see for a more elaborate survey: Den Butter and Mosch, 2003). This 
is the arena where interaction between scientific knowledge and the policy dispute 
takes place. Finally some other institutions are discussed that play a more broader role 
in policy making in the Netherlands 
 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) 
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The Central Planning Bureau (CPB) was originally founded as a central planning 
bureau for economic affairs. It started in 1945 but obtained a formal status by law only 
in 1947. In spite of the fact that the CPB is formally part of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, it fulfils its advisory task independently from government interference. This 
status of independence is recognised by all parties and stakeholders in the policy 
making process, which provides the analyses of the CPB with high reputation and 
esteem. The two major periodic publications of the CPB are the Central Economic 
Plan (CEP) and the Macroeconomic Outlook (MEV). The Central Economic Plan is 
published each year in springtime and contains a survey and analysis of economic 
developments in the Netherlands and abroad. It contains economic forecasts for the 
current and for the following year. The MEV is published together with the 
government budget in September each year. The forecasts of the economy in the next 
year are formal in the sense that the government budget has to be based on these data. 
Moreover, the MEV also gives revised projections for the current year.  
 
In fact, nowadays the CPB has two major tasks. The first is the task of national 
auditor: this implies economic forecasting and assessment of the effects of policy 
measures for the government and for other groups involved in the policy making 
process, such as the social partners. The second task consists of the CPB conducting, 
in a more general sense, applied economic research (see Don, 1996). Nowadays the 
latter tasks gain importance: extensive scenario analyses and cost benefit analyses are 
conducted with respect to various aspects of the Dutch economy. There is also a shift 
towards micro-economic research and evaluation studies. Typical for the institutional 
set-up of Dutch policy-making are the numerous formal and informal contacts between 
the staff of the CPB and the economists at ministries, researchers in academia and the 
staff of the social partners. On the one hand, they provide relevant information to the 
CPB, but, on the other hand, they will, if needed, be critical on the work of the CPB. 
 
Since Tinbergen (1936) has built the first econometric policy model it is 
understandable that model based policy analysis has, from the origin, constituted an 
important part of the work of the CPB. The CPB’s ‘model’ early acquired a high status 
in academic circles and has come to be regarded in Dutch society as an objective piece 
of economic science (Den Butter and Morgan, 1998). The analyses of the CPB are 
widely used as input for social economic policy discussions, e.g. in the Social 
Economic Council (see below). The next section elaborates a typical example of the 
role of the CPB in using their model based analysis for policy purposes, namely the 
calculation of the effects of the policy proposals in the election programmes of the 
political parties on economic growth, employment, income distribution and so on. 
Seemingly, it is almost a realisation of Tinbergen’s dream to separate the knowledge 
on the working of the economy, which is contained in the models used by the CPB, 
and the normative preferences on trade-offs between policy goals, which will differ for 
each political party. 
 
Foundation of Labour and Social Economic Council 
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It is typical for the institutional set-up of the social dialogue in the Netherlands (i.e. the 
polder model) that the social partners are at the heart of the consultation structure for 
economic and social policy. The “Foundation of Labour” (STAR) is the formal 
platform where employees and employers meet each other on a structural basis. It was 
founded in 1945 as a private organisation and acts as a bilateral discussion forum in 
the field of labour standards for unions and employer associations. The seats are 
equally divided between the two, and both sides deliver one of the two chairmen. The 
results of the discussions are stated in so-called “central agreements”. This occurs 
about once in two or three years.  
 
Yet, the major forum for political discussions is the Social Economic Council (SER). 
The SER is the main policy advisory board for the government regarding social 
economic issues. Its constellation is tripartite. Labour unions, employer associations 
and independent “members of the crown” each possesses one third of the seats. The 
independent members consist of professors in economics or law, politicians, the 
president of the Dutch Central Bank and the director of the CPB.  
 
It is through these independent members that the policy discussions within the SER 
benefit from the insights of scientific research. In this way, also the members from the 
trade unions and from the employers organisations are bound to be professionals who 
are knowledgeable of the scientific framework of the discussions, and speak the same 
“language” as the independent members. The analyses of the CPB and also of the 
Dutch Central Bank carry a large weight in these discussions. Policy advices by the 
SER are prepared in committees, wherein representatives of the three categories 
discuss and amend texts drafted by the SER’s Secretariat. Representatives of various 
ministries attend these committee meetings, but formally they are observers. They will 
not take part in discussions unless they are asked to provide relevant information. So, 
unlike in other countries, where the third party in tripartite council discussions is the 
government, in the Netherlands scientists, as independent third party in the discussion, 
see to it that the social partners do not come to agreements which are harmful to 
society as a whole. This would be the case when the costs of the policy measures 
agreed upon, are shifted to the society as a whole.  
 
Obviously it is important for the impact of the SER recommendations that they are 
supported unanimously. It is quite exceptional that the government would disregard a 
SER unanimous policy recommendation. The independent members can be helpful in 
reaching a consensus recommendation in informal discussions. The SER chairman, 
who is also an independent member and understandably has a crucial position in this 
institutionalised social dialogue, plays a major role. It is true that the independent 
members are selected and appointed in such a way that their political backgrounds 
more or less reflect the political landscape in the Netherlands. This may somewhat 
obscure the division between statements based on scientific insights and political 
preferences in the discussion. Recently the political background of the independent 
members of the SER has become more important and former politicians with little 
experience in academic research have been appointed as independent members. So 
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there is a risk that scientific insights will play a less substantial role in the discussions, 
and that the discussions will focus on bridging political differences. On the other hand, 
at least in the past, on some occasions the political background of the independent 
members has been quite instrumental in reaching an agreement. It happened that an 
academic member associated with the socialist, left wing party would interfere in the 
discussions and tell the trade unions that their demands were unfair, or that an 
academic member associated with the liberal, right wing party would tell the members 
of the employers organisations that their demands were to high.   
 
Other institutes 
Like in most other countries the Central Bank – The Netherlands Bank (DNB) – plays 
a major role in economic policy making. Nowadays the major task of DNB is to 
enhance and guarantee the stability of the payment system, whereas its former main 
task, namely  to conduct monetary policy in order to combat inflation, has been 
delegated to the European Central Bank. Yet the role of DNB in the policy discussions 
in the Netherlands is not restricted to banking supervision or (advice on) monetary 
policy. Officers of the Bank take part in the most the prominent forums for policy 
discussions in the Dutch polder model. As mentioned before, the president of DNB is a 
member of the Social Economic Council and DNB officers participate in various 
meetings where SER advices are drafted. Moreover there is ample informal 
coordination with fiscal policy: the president of DNB has regular lunches with the 
Minister of Finance and the Treasurer General (a high ranking civil servant in the 
Ministry).DNB officers are members of various ad hoc and regular committees in The 
Hague, which are an important part of the policy making process but remain somewhat 
out of sight of the formal institutional set-up.  
 
Sometimes, when no consensus can be reached about difficult policy problems within 
the formal institutional framework of the polder model, special committees are 
established for policy advice on these problems. An example is the new design for the 
social security arrangement for disabled workers. At the end of the 20th century there 
has been a long period of disagreement about how to solve this problem. Finally in 
2001 the government established a committee which consisted of members 
representing various political backgrounds and which was chaired by Piet Hein Donner 
(a prominent member of the Christian Democratic Party, former chairman of the 
Scientific Council for Government Policy and Minister of Legal Affairs in the 
Balkenende II cabinet). This committee reached agreement about a new arrangement 
for disabled workers which was thereafter - with some minor changes - approved by 
the Social Economic Council. However, the advice was not unanimous because three 
independent members did not consider the new arrangement as an improvement. 
 
Apart from the CPB, at the end of the 20th century three other so called “planning 
bureaus” were established in the Netherlands. In 1972 the Social and Cultural Planning 
Bureau (SCP) was founded. Like in case of the CPB the task of this bureau is not so 
much formal planning but it is monitoring and indicating future developments with 
respect to the social and cultural level of welfare of the Netherlands population. In the 
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late 1990’s an Environmental and Nature Planning Bureau was established within the 
existing large Institutes for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). In 2006 this 
Environmental Planning Bureau has become fully independent form the RIVM. 
Finally a new Spatial Planning Bureau was founded in January 2002. The aim was to 
come to an institute at distance from the existing departmental planning procedures to 
use its professional standards in order to create a broad vision on matters of spatial 
planning. The division of tasks between the four planning bureaus is described in a 
protocol.  
 
All directors of the four planning bureaus and the general director of the CBS are 
external members of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) which was 
founded in 1972 to provide advice to the government about long term policies. The 
WRR is a multi-disciplinary council with about eight members and a small staff of 
about twenty persons. Most members have an academic background and have, in one 
way or another, already been involved in the policy consultation process in the 
Netherlands. The council is part of the Prime Minister’s office, but it is completely 
independent in its long term policy advice. The major part of the subjects of advice on 
which the WRR writes its reports to the government, are initiated by the members of 
the council themselves. The advices of the WRR are bound to be unanimous, although 
the possibility exists for individual members to write a minority advice. One of the 
functions of the WRR has become to ring the alarm bell when the closeness of the 
consultation structure in the Netherlands leads to inertia and even to lock-ins in the 
process of policy making, so that radical changes were not initiated. Some reports of 
the WRR have been very influential in this respect.  
 
Finally, after discussions in parliament in 2003, in 2005 the Council of Economic 
Advisors, consisting of five leading Dutch economists, has been established in order to 
strengthen the role of the parliament in discussions on economic policy. The council 
has to act as countervailing power and has to produce second opinions regarding the 
economic outlooks and advices of the CPB, the OECD and the IMF. The council has 
produced its first critical reports, but it is yet unclear how influential they will be. 
  
4 An example: economic effects of election programmes 
 
The fact that  the major political parties ask the CPB to calculate the economic effects 
of their election programmes is much in conformity with the institutional set-up of 
policy making in the Netherlands where the knowledge on the working of the economy 
is, according to the theory of economic policy, separated from the normative 
preferences on trade-offs between policy goals. These policy preferences will differ for 
each political party (or pillar).  
 
Therefore it is not remarkable that the CPB conducts these assessments; it may be even 
more remarkable that it only started to do so in 1986. In that year the three major 
parties: the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the Socialists ask the CPB to look at 
the effects of their economic policy proposals. In 1989 the liberal socialists of D66 
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also participated in the exercise and in 1994 the Green-Left party, after some fierce 
internal discussions, were the fifth party to participate. In 1998 the assessment also 
related to the policy programmes of these five political parties whereas in 2002 the 
exercise was extended to eight political parties. It should again be emphasised that the 
CPB conducts the assessment at the request of the political parties and does not, apart 
from the timing of the exercise, take any initiative on its own. So it is the own will of 
the political parties whether they want their program be examined by the CPB. In this 
way they aim to obtain the stamp of approval of the CPB. Although there may be some 
herding involved in the decision of the political parties to participate (it may be 
regarded as a negative signal when parties do not participate) and although the smaller 
political parties complain that the exercise is relatively costly and time consuming for 
them, the impression is that the major political parties consider the assessment as 
useful as it brings discipline and budgetary consistency when drafting the programme. 
So it actively contributes to quality improvement in the political process. Moreover, in 
the larger political parties, with many hobby horses and shades of opinions between 
the active members, the assessment makes life easier for the person who has the 
responsibility for budgetary consistency of the program. So, in the exercise in 2002, 
the financial spokesman of the Socialist party, Ferd Crone, discussed his input into the 
assessment of the CPB with two persons only, namely the political leader (Melkert) 
and the chairman of the party (Koole). 
 
Of course, there is a major dilemma that the CPB faces in the assessment. On the one 
hand there is much value in obtaining quantitative information on effects of various 
policy proposals in the election programmes. However, a completely objective and 
politically unbiased judgement on these policy proposals can never be given. Although 
a good quantitative economist will conduct his or her analysis as objective as possible, 
a complete separation, as especially political scientists would emphasise, can never be 
made between analysis and normative preferences. It must be said that CPB has put 
much effort in the design of the assessment procedure to guarantee the unbiasedness of 
the outcomes, but the selection of the models and the input of much tacit human 
knowledge into the assessment (see Don, 2003 for a description of the procedure) will 
not completely prevent value judgement from creeping into the procedure. Therefore, 
apart from the value creating elements in the assessment, also some objections have 
been raised against this procedure (see e.g. The Review Committee of the CPB, 1997). 
Below both a number of the pro’s of the assessment and a number of these con’s are 
discussed. 
 
Pros 
There are a number of reasons why the assessment exercise can be regarded as a 
contribution to the qualified use of scientific knowledge in policy preparation. Some of 
these reasons have already been alluded to above. The first source of value of the 
exercise is that all policy proposals in the election programmes are calculated using a 
consistent model-based framework. It implies that the calculated effects on the policy 
goals are comparable for all political parties. In this way the assessment gives the 
impression of the implicit social welfare function of the various political parties. So 
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the voters may decide which of the parties has a welfare function that agrees most with 
their own preferences. 
 
In fact the assessment procedure consists of three steps. The first step is that the 
political parties are confronted with a basis scenario which is somewhat cautious about 
future developments and which is “policy poor”. It means that trends in government 
expenditures in the main fields of policy concern (care, education, social security) 
have been extrapolated on the assumption of no additional policy efforts. So the policy 
proposals of the political parties are defined as changes with respect trend growths 
implicit in this basic scenario. It implies that, when the political parties propose a cut 
in spending in one policy field in order to be able to intensify expenditure in another 
policy field, it does not mean that there is an absolute decrease in spending in that first 
policy field, but only a relative decrease as compared to the basic scenario. Of course 
this makes a careful wording of the assessment in the public debate necessary. 
 
A second step in the assessment procedure is budgetary accounting. A definition 
equation describes in what way the political parties are planning to use the so-called 
“budgetary space” according to the basic projection plus cuts in spending they 
propose. This use can be threefold, namely for additional spending, for reduction of 
the tax and premium burden and for reduction of the government debt. Obviously this 
accounting rule is not based on model assumptions and on economic behaviour, and 
contains no value judgement in that respect. It is noticeable that the rules and 
procedures for this budgetary accounting, including the norm for the budget surplus, 
are extensively discussed in policy advices of the Social Economic Council (SER) and 
in the so-called Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte which is a committee of high ranked 
civil servants of Ministries and of experts of the Central Bank on budgetary policy. 
This is another example of the interaction between scientists and various stakeholders 
in the policy discussions in the polder model. 
 
The working of the models and the assumptions on the economic behaviour implicit in 
these models do play a major role in the third step of the assessment procedure. Here 
the effects of the policy proposals on the labour market, on product markets and on 
income distribution are calculated. There is, moreover, some feedback to the second 
step of the procedure as the model based exercise may yield negative or positive 
second order effects for the government budget. However, in the most recent 
assessments of the CPB the second order effects are relatively small as compared to 
second order effects found in previous assessment exercises (on which there has been 
much debate). 
 
Therefore, a second major advantage of the assessment procedure is that the political 
parties are forced to think about this budgetary consistency. It means that the political 
parties have to be very strict on their proposals and cannot promise mountains of gold 
at no costs. More in general this discipline in making consistent policy plans can be 
regarded as a major value added in the use of models for economic policy analysis. It 
does not only bring discipline in the policy plans, there is also ample interaction 
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between the policy makers and the modelling experts on what kind of policy 
instruments are most effective in achieving the warranted policy goals. This interaction 
also occurs in the discussions of the CPB experts and makers of the election 
programmes of the political parties. Yet, the CPB's procedure is strict in the sense that 
the final outcome cannot be influenced by the political parties anymore. Moreover, 
during the procedure there is no information and discussion between the political 
parties how they proceed in the assessment procedure and on the implementation of 
the CPB of their policy proposals. A proof of the fact that the assessment procedure 
brings consistency is that during the elections of 2003, when no assessment could be 
made due to a short election period, there were much complaints in the media about 
financial inconsistencies in the political programmes.  
 
A third source of value of the assessment procedure is that the policy discussion takes 
place in line with the CPB's believe on the working of the economy which is based on 
sound economic theory, on empirical research and on a deep knowledge of economic 
institutions in the Netherlands. The policy analysis of the CPB provides a kind of 
common language as framework for the policy discussions. This common language 
lowers the transaction costs in, e.g. the negotiations between the social partners. It is 
even remarkable how much, to give an example, the advice of the SER on medium 
term policy for the period 2002-2006 heavily relies on studies conducted by the CPB 
(see SER, 2002). So the economic framework used in the assessment of the 
programmes of the political parties is familiar to all professional participants in the 
policy discussions in the Netherlands. They all use the terminology of the CPB, and 
accept and interpret the outcomes of the analyses of the CPB accordingly. Moreover, 
the CPB has, in these circles, a high reputation for the quality of its analysis. It would 
take a long time for other institutes to build up a similar reputation. Because of the 
large investments costs in specific knowledge on this type of calculations, proliferation 
of such policy assessments of the election programmes would bring about huge costs 
given the size of the Dutch economy. In this respect the Dutch economy cannot be 
compared with the German economy, which has six major institutes for economic 
policy analysis. 
 
A final and most prominent source of value of the assessment is that the calculations 
contribute considerably to lowering the negotiation costs when after the elections a 
coalition government has to be formed. Due to the assessment, the negotiators in the 
formation process are aware of the effects which the proposals of the various election 
programmes have, according to the calculations of the CPB, on the policy goals. This 
has proven useful information in order to come to a compromise and reach a 
government agreement which consists of a combination of the most effective policy 
proposals from the programmes.. So, in an informal way, the assessment contributes to 
establish an overall social welfare function from the individual preferences of the 
political parties which constitute the government. 
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Cons 
Most arguments in favour of the assessment of the programmes of the previous section 
also contain a seed from which doubt may grow on the value of the exercise of the 
CPB. It is already mentioned that it is impossible to calculate the effects of policy 
proposals in  a completely objective way. There will always be normative aspects and 
some subjective interpretations in the implementation of the policy proposals in the 
modelling exercise. On previous occasions, as part of the learning process, there have 
been ample discussions between the makers of the programmes and the staff of the 
CPB on this implementation. In the recent exercise the room for these discussions has 
been restricted by keeping a tight time schedule. As yet, all three steps in the 
calculation procedure discussed in the previous section, contain elements of discretion. 
The basis scenario and the resulting calculation of the budgetary space is based on 
sound projections of structural growth, but, as a cautious trend projection underlies the 
scenario, the probability of a higher structural growth is larger than the probability of a 
lower structural growth. It makes the basic scenario somewhat difficult to interpret. 
There is no room for differences in interpretation in the second step: here the budget 
constraint says that by definition the budgetary space plus cuts in spending should be 
equal to additional government expenditure plus tax reductions plus additional 
reduction of the government debt. However, the third step, where a mix of the models 
of the CPB is used for calculating the effects and propagation dynamics of the various 
policy proposals, is bound to many underlying assumptions. It may happen that the 
makers of the policy programmes disagree with the major mechanisms of the models 
used for the calculations. A first and not much complicated disagreement would be 
about calibrated or estimated values of the parameters of the models. Graafland (2003) 
shows that such differences in parameter values may already give rise to huge 
differences in the calculated effects of the policy proposals. A second and more 
fundamental disagreement would be about the dynamics of the model, namely the lag 
structure and the propagation speed of the policy proposals. This has been a cause of 
disagreement between the Christian Democratic Party and the CPB in the previous 
assessment of the election programmes in 1998. (See Verbon, 1998 and Don, 1998). 
The most serious objection of the makers of the policy programmes would be when 
they disagree with the working and specification of the model and its theoretical 
underpinning. In that case their request would be for the use of different models 
specifications. All in all the political parties may ask for a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to these kind of specification changes. However, that would be very time 
consuming and would also involve the danger that the political parties go shopping for 
good results.  
 
Although ideally the assessment is to reveal the social welfare function of each 
political party, in reality the assessment exercise does not provide a clear cut insight 
into the trade-offs between policy goals and into the preferences of the political 
parties. The outcomes are rather complicated in their mix of policy goals, input of 
various instruments and propagation dynamics. So some parties will have favourable 
effects on the short run, whereas their long-run economic performance is lower than 
that of other parties. This rich diversity of outcomes makes it difficult to select the 
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political party with preferences that comes closest to one's own individual welfare 
function. That's why the assessment, apart from its technical character, is not very 
helpful to make laymen voters decide about their favourite party. The CPB tries hard 
to present the outcomes in an opaque way, and all political parties will stress that their 
outcomes are the best given their own criteria of judgements for the outcomes. On the 
other hand, the policy debate may be very selective with respect to the outcomes. 
Politicians can be, in their election campaigns, rather eager to blow up specific policy 
consequences, mainly with respect to the effects on employment, and give it much 
more weight than the uncertainties in the calculations allow. For instance in 1998, a 
leader of the Liberals argued that the Christian Democrats were not ready for 
government because their programme failed in enhancing employment. In the 
assessment of 2002 there were some misunderstandings in the press about the effect on 
purchasing power of lower and higher incomes, due to the CPB's definition of lower 
and higher incomes where the class of higher incomes also comprised (lower) middle 
incomes. 
 
Another problem with the assessment exercise, unavoidable though, is that the 
calculations of the CPB are highly technical so that they are very difficult to judge for 
laymen and relative outsiders. It is really an insiders exercise, the scope of which can 
only be understood fully by experts. So only a few professionals are fluent in the 
language of the CPB and really know to interpret the working of the models. 
Moreover, it is questionably whether the results can be reproduced completely by 
outsiders (see also Graafland, 2003). In fact, the calculations are made by different 
models which generally do not yield the same impulse response effects. So a lot of not 
fully documented judgement is included in the exercise in combining the effects 
according to the various models. 
 
A further source of distress on the exercise is that a number of aspects, which political 
parties (and the public!) may consider as important, cannot be taken into account in the 
calculations. These may be either positive effects, such as e.g. policy measures to 
enhance the quality of education, or to make the health system more efficient without 
additional expenditures, or negative effects of high transaction and transition costs that 
policy measures may bring about. More in general the assessment is confined to a 
quantification of the economic effects of the policy proposals. Although the 
assessment of 2002 has extended the analysis to a quality assessment with respect to 
the environment, the public health sector and disability, there is a danger that other 
important issues in the election campaign remain underexposed such as values, norms 
and the preservation of social capital, safety and crime prevention and government 
failure. The solution would be that the other planning bureau’s would also make an 
assessment, albeit qualitatively, in their field of competence. As a matter of fact the 
Environmental Planning Bureau publishes its assessment in line with the assessment of 
the CPB. 
 
A final and most interesting problem, or side effect of the assessment, is that the 
makers of the party programmes have become familiar with the properties of the 
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models of the CPB and will, in the policy proposals see to it that they are effective in 
terms of the CPB models. In fact a bad performance in the CPB calculations, 
especially with respect to employment, has, on previous occasions, proved to lead to a 
loss of votes in the elections. The result is that this procedure generates those policy 
proposals of the political parties which are most beneficial according to the models of 
the CPB. So it has led to a remarkable convergence of policy plans, especially between 
the established parties, which would qualify for participation in the government. E.g., 
in the assessment of 2002, the policy proposals of the Green Left party (“Groen-
Links”) are so much in line with the proposals of the other parties that they were not 
excluded from taking part of the government by other parties beforehand. This 
convergence may have contributed to the lack of interest of the Dutch population for 
general elections – apart from “depillarisation” which may be another course. 
Moreover, there is a risk that the way the CPB models describe economic reality is not 
correct, so that all political parties are betting on the wrong horse in the design of their 
programmes. This would imply an extraordinary example of a political lock-in.  
 
It is true that, as Don (2003) argues, it enhances welfare when the makers of the 
political programmes exploit the properties of the CPB models when these models 
give an adequate description of reality. However, the dominant role of the models of 
the CPB and their implicit conceptual framework with which all economists in the 
country have been educated, may lead to path dependence in the analysis. A kind of 
discourse coalition will emanate, which may exclude new and relevant conceptual 
ideas. (See Van den Bogaard, 2002). That is why, in the institutional framework of the 
Dutch polder model, with its frequent interactions between professionals in the policy 
making process who all speak the same scientific language, some countervailing 
power of outsiders should be organised and facilitated in order to prevent such 
conceptual lock-ins. 
 
5 Quality control of scientific advice 
 
The description above of the institutional set-up of the process of policy preparation in 
the Netherlands already implicitly deals with some questions with respect to the 
quality control and assurance in scientific advice to policy. This section contains a 
more explicit discussion of these questions. There are two basic questions. The first is 
how to guarantee that the scientific advice itself has good quality, makes use of state of 
the art scientific knowledge and is policy relevant. This is a question of quality control 
and reputation formation within the scientific community itself. The second question 
regards the propagation of the scientific knowledge and advice to the policy makers. 
Here it is important how the propagation of scientific knowledge and the interaction 
between scientists and policy makers is organised.  
 
What is quality? 
From an operational point of view the quality of scientific advice for policy making is 
very difficult to assess. Of course, from a highly theoretical perspective, that scientific 
advice to policy has the highest quality which contributes most to social welfare. 
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However, even with the benefit of hindsight, the contribution of scientific advice to 
welfare cannot be measured. Firstly that is because social welfare itself is difficult to 
measure. Social welfare functions are a theoretical construct, where at most some 
information on (political) trade-offs between various policy goals (e.g. income per 
head, equality, environmental quality, employment) can be obtained by surveys, or, ex 
post, by revealed preferences.  Moreover, in modern economic thinking the concept of 
a social welfare function representing political preferences has somewhat lost its 
prominent role in political economy. Instead the actual implementation of policy plans 
is seen as the outcome of the process of negotiation between various stakeholders with 
different interests. In that theoretical model the outcome depends on the negotiation 
power of the stakeholders.  
 
A second reason why the quality of the advice is difficult to assess, is that at the macro 
level there is no control experiment. It is only in a model based calculation that the 
difference between the development without and with a policy measure can be 
computed. This is what an impulse-response analysis does. Such analysis 
(“spoorboekjes”– railroad time tables – as Tinbergen called it) is used by the CPB to 
assess the effects of policy measures before they are implemented, for instance in the 
calculation of the effects of the election programmes. A suggestion in this respect for 
further quality control is to perform a similar calculation after the implementation of 
the policy plan, by way of post mortem analysis.         
 
Which criteria for quality? 
Because of these difficulties in assessing the quality of scientific policy advice, one 
should be pragmatic in setting criteria for the judgement of that quality. Criteria can be 
related to the two questions posed above. A first set of criteria should state the quality 
of the advice as far as it is based on state of the art scientific knowledge and empirical 
observations. Here the usual criteria used in the scientific community hold: the 
analysis should be peer reviewed, reproducible and based on public sources, open to 
the scientific debate. These criteria are discussed and used widely in science policy, so 
that they do not need further attention in this paper. In fact, these criteria can be 
associated with the consensus part of the set-up of the polder model.  
 
The second set of criteria is about the propagation of the scientific knowledge to the 
policy makers, and about the way interaction between scientific knowledge and 
policymakers (and/or stakeholders) is organised in order to come to public support for 
the policy measures. Here the criteria are associated with the compromise part of the 
polder model. The criteria should enable a judgement on (i) whether the scientific 
knowledge is implemented in a correct way in the policy plans, (ii) whether feedback’s 
from politicians and stakeholders have been sufficiently incorporated in the policy 
plans, (iii) whether the independence of the scientific advice has been preserved when 
incorporating this feedback and no political pressure has been exerted on the scientific 
advisors to adapt the results to warranted outcomes, (iv) whether an open debate on 
policy measures and their measured effects has been organised so that lock-ins are 
avoided, (v) whether public support for the policy plans has been obtained in an 
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opaque way (no cheating or window dressing), (vi) whether the calculated effects of 
the policy plans sufficiently reproduce preferences (or best interests) of stakeholders, 
and (vii) whether, in a post mortem analysis, the implementation costs of the policy 
measures appeared to be reasonably low.        
 
Whereas the first set of criteria is directly related to the way the production of 
scientific knowledge is organised, a good performance on the second set of criteria 
depends on the institutional set-up of the process of policy preparation. So a main 
message is that the quality control in scientific advice to policy depends much on the 
way the propagation of scientific knowledge to policy practice is institutionalised in 
formal and informal procedures. That is why this paper puts so much emphasis on the 
history and working of the polder model in the Netherlands.     
 
Institutions and formalised procedures 
As mentioned before, in the institutionalised procedures of the polder model to obtain 
public support for policy measures discussions and compromise advices of the SER 
play a major role. So most of the above criteria of judgement on the quality of the 
scientific advice are applicable to the SER. Here it is the task of the independent 
members to see to it that advices are based on, and consistent with up to date scientific 
knowledge. So they are an important chain in the propagation of scientific knowledge 
into policy practice. It is through these independent members that the policy 
discussions within the SER benefit from the insights of scientific research.  
 
The SER has an important function in promoting trust between the various policy 
makers by acting as a platform of discussion for social partners, government, central 
bank, CPB and scientists. The positive role of the SER has, however, not always been 
recognized by the government. The legal provision that the government was obliged to 
ask the SER for advice on all proposals for social-economic legislation was abolished 
in 1995. The feeling had arisen at the government level that this procedure took too 
much time and caused too much “stickiness” in the policy preparation procedures. 
However, instead of weakening the position of the SER in the process of policy 
preparation, this measure seems to have strengthened it. The measure worked, 
probably unintended by the government, as a trigger mechanism for the members of 
the SER to reach consensus in its policy recommendations. Recommendations that are 
signed unanimously by the three parties involved give a strong signal to the 
government of societal consensus on specific policy measures, and are therefore much 
more powerful than recommendations that reflect divided opinions. As mentioned 
above, the Dutch culture of consensus puts strong pressure on the government to 
follow unanimous recommendations. The government is, however, not bound to act in 
the way the SER recommends, although it is obliged to give a formal reaction 
statement at every published advice.  
 
In this institutional set-up the SER thus fulfils two main purposes. First, it works as a 
device for the government to get informed about the points of view of employee and 
employer organizations about social-economic questions. Especially the unanimous 
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recommendations give the government clues about what policy measures will be 
supported by society. Second, the SER works as a platform that brings together 
employee and employer organizations to talk with each other about social-economic 
matters. The presence of economic and legal scientists makes sure that the discussions 
are based on solid arguments. In this way they learn about each motives and objectives 
for and against certain policy measures. This prevents misunderstandings and can form 
a basis for developing mutual trust (see Den Butter and Mosch, 2003, Mosch, 2004). It 
also contributes that policy plans are based on consistent and good quality economic 
knowledge. 
 
One of the major aspects in the negotiations in the SER, which is related to the idea of 
trust, is that the main negotiators meet each other regularly both in formal and in 
informal meetings. So it is the repeated game aspect of trust formation which plays an 
important role here. An example of this attitude can be found in an interview by 
Klamer (1990) on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the SER. Klamer posed the 
following question to Jan Stekelenburg, at that time the chairman of FNV, the largest 
trade union. ‘My impression is that you and Van Lede – chairman of the largest 
employers organisation – are very much on speaking terms and that you are more 
friendly to each other than the outside world believes you are.’ Stekelenburg’s answer 
is: ‘No, no, that is not true! It is certainly not true that we’re constantly fighting with 
each other, but at the moment of conflict it is clear and apparent and we don’t ease the 
problem when we are together.’ Then Klamer asked: ‘Did it happen that you were 
really angry with Van Lede?’ Stekelenburg replied: ‘Yes, when there is really a large 
conflict I may be angry. However, it will happen in a way which does not harm our 
future relationship, because we are condemned to each other. We need each other in 
these negotiations on labour relations, so that we should be aware that after a big 
quarrel we will always be forced to come back to business in a next situation. So the 
real hard and definite battle will never be fought.’ 
 
These examples illustrate that the Dutch institutional framework for social-economic 
policy preparation has several characteristics that favour the formation of trust and co-
operation. To begin with, it is, as explained before, the character trait or culture 
prevalent in the Netherlands that is favourable to co-operation and consensus. In other 
words, there seems to be a sort of “basic trust” upon which actual mutual trust can be 
developed. This can also be related to the idea of the path-dependency of trust (see for 
example Putnam, 1993). Given the fact that most people in a society feel inclined to 
act in trustworthy ways, it is beneficial for all people to keep to this way of transacting, 
because it will raise extra benefits for the involved parties by being able to solve co-
ordination type of games.  
 
The Dutch institutional framework seems to fit almost completely with micro findings 
on how to build trust-enhancing networks. The group of players is relatively small. As 
we have seen from the interview by Klamer (1990) there is a lot of repeated contacts 
between the players. A substantial part of it is face-to-face and informal (see e.g. 
Ostrom and Walker (1997) for an analysis of public good games in which face-to-face 
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communication leads to substantial increases in co-operation). Every player belongs to 
an organisation, so reputations can be smoothly transferred from one representative of 
the organisation to the other. With other words, a reputation of trustworthiness does 
not disappear (completely) when individual persons are replaced. Reputations are 
important, because policy-making is a dynamic process. Organisations meet each other 
over and over again, and know that this will not change in the coming years. Together 
with the aspect of the small group, this leads to the fact that the possibilities for 
learning and control are substantial. It has also implications for the way unanimity is 
reached in the advices. Occasionally when opinions of the social partners are too far 
apart, trying to reach unanimity is not desirable as it may prevent, in the repeated game 
of the discussions in the SER, to come to an unanimous agreement the next time when 
such unanimity is more urgent.  
 
 
All in all trust formation and the use of trust between the leaders of the various groups 
of stakeholders is one of the major mechanisms in the Netherlands for quality control 
of  scientific policy advice. In a broad respect Hoppe and Halffman (2004) distinguish 
three patters of institutionalisation of scientific advice in policy preparation in the 
Netherlands. The first is the corporatist  approach of organising scientific input in the 
policy debate and negotiations between the social partners. Advantages of this way of 
institutionalising are discussed above: stable platforms of negotiation, consistent use of 
scientific knowledge and trust formation between various stakeholders. A 
disadvantage can be that outsiders and outsiders knowledge are excluded from the 
discussions and that the discussion are locked-in within the dominant discourse 
coalition (see Van den Boogaart, 2002). 
 
According to Hoppe and Halffman, the second pattern is the neo liberal, decisionistic 
way of obtaining scientific advice for the design of policy measures. Here policy 
makers “buy” advice from independent and often commercial centres of expertise. 
This pattern is linked to the increased attention for efficiency through the working of 
markets in economic policy. A third pattern is a tendency towards a more interactive 
and deliberative way of organising the debate between stakeholders (see e.g. Van de 
Kerkhof, 2004). From the (Tinbergen) viewpoint of economic policy such stakeholder 
participation can be useful in order to obtain more information on, and/or to shape and 
sharpen the preferences and interests of stakeholders, so that they become more 
explicit (see Den Butter, 2005). More generally it is important to be clear about the 
aim of stakeholder participation when it is to be organised and eventually 
institutionalised. The aim can be (i) obtain insight in stakeholder preferences; (ii) 
articulate stakeholder preferences; (iii) strive at convergence of preferences; (iv) obtain 
information on negotiating power of stakeholders. Each case requires a specific set-up 
of stakeholders participation.   
 
Debate and controversy 
The separation in the polder model between data collection, the working of the 
economy and policy goals derived from political preferences, should also apply to the 
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public debate and controversy about the policy plans. Data collection should be 
indisputable so that here the debate should be confined to internal discussions between 
the experts. CBS has been quite successful in this respect. The most disputed part of 
the institutional set-up of the polder model is the separation of the debate and 
controversy on scientific knowledge on the working of the economy and on policy 
preferences. Of course, in practice such clear separation of responsibilities is 
impossible so that often the public debate is obscured by mixing opinions on the 
working of the economy with opinions on policy goals and their contribution to 
welfare. Especially this problem arises when expert economists become opinion 
leaders and disguise their political preferences in debates on economic effectiveness of 
policy measures. Indeed, the discussions in the SER will not always reflect the ideal 
set up of Tinbergens’ polder model either and arguments on the working of the 
economy will be mixed with political preferences (see Woldendorp, 2005). 
 
The most relevant arena of debate from the perspective of this paper is the scientific 
debate on the working of the economy and consequently the appropriateness of 
measures of economic policy. Here the institutional set-up of the polder model is to 
find a subtle balance between reaching agreement amongst experts and widening the 
scientific debate. Much and long lasting disagreement between experts would weaken 
the position of scientific knowledge and would make policy preparation less efficient. 
On the other hand, early exclusion of outsiders opinions would lead to lock-ins and to 
dominant discourse coalitions. In order to illustrate this aspect of the polder model 
some examples of debate and controversy on the role and work of the CPB are given 
below.      
 
Monopoly versus competition 
CPB’s reputation of conducting independent analyses has been challenged from time 
to time both in academia and by the press, especially with respect to its task of formal 
auditor for the government. Here the position of the CPB is in fact that of a monopolist 
and it is true that the CPB has a special position, as it has access to confidential 
information on government policy. This position is needed in order to be able to react 
promptly on questions by policymakers, which mainly regard technical and accounting 
aspects in policy discussions. Yet, in the institutional framework for policy making in 
the Netherlands a number of checks and balances have been built in order to prevent 
the CPB to misuse its monopoly position. There is a regular evaluation of the work of 
the CPB by external expert commissions. Moreover misuse of its monopoly position 
would also immediately destroy much of the reputation that the bureau has built up so 
carefully. Besides, as already mentioned, it is a question of efficiency to have, in a 
relatively small country as the Netherlands, only one institute which is responsible for 
this kind of macroeconomic forecasting and policy evaluations. This task requires a lot 
of specific investments and hence the institute has to be quite sizeable. It is typical for 
the institutional set-up of Dutch policy making that there are numerous formal and 
informal contacts between the staff of the CPB and the economists at ministries, 
researchers in academia and the staff of the social partners. On the one hand they 
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provide relevant information to the CPB, but, on the other hand, they will, if needed, 
be critical on the work of the CPB. 
 
The CPB does not hold a monopoly position for its second task, namely that of 
institute of applied economic research. Here, it competes both with other Dutch 
institutes and with institutes abroad. Nowadays the CPB is asked more frequently than 
before to give a second opinion on research conduct by other institutes. In the same 
way, there is, for instance, no objection that political parties ask second opinions on 
the effectiveness of parts of their programmes to other researchers, including research 
institutes at universities. Yet, a full economic assessment of the programmes in the 
way conducted by the CPB, cannot be done by other institutes because of the costs 
involved in investments in specific knowledge and building up of reputation in the 
institutions of policy preparation in the Netherlands.    
 
Wage moderation 
The policy of wage moderation, which is, in retrospect generally supposed to be very 
beneficial to the Netherlands, has been subject to much controversy and debate. In the 
1950’s and 1960’s, years of prosperous economic growth and almost full employment, 
the Dutch government conducted an active counter cyclical policy of demand 
management. This policy was supported by the first generation of models of the CPB, 
which were short term Keynesian demand models. According to these models a rise in 
government spending, but also wage increases, resulted in more demand and a higher 
economic activity. When unemployment and inflation were rising in the 1970’s – the 
phenomenon of stagflation -, a new generation of policy models of the CPB challenged 
this policy prescription (see Den Butter, 1991). The first turning point was about at 
1975 when the CPB started to use the Vintaf-model. The clay-clay vintage approach 
by Den Hartog and Tjan (1974, 1976) in this model showed that a rise in real wages 
exceeding the rate of technical progress caused increased scrapping of capital goods 
and hence increased unemployment. So according to this model the negative neo-
classical effect on employment of a wage increase was larger than the positive 
Keynesian spending effect. In 1977, the Central Economic Commission, one of these 
important commissions of highly ranked government officers in the polder model, 
based its projections and policy advice for the medium term on the outcomes of the 
Vintaf-model. This evoked a vivid and unique debate among academics and 
government specialists on the merits and shortcomings of the model (see Driehuis and 
Van der Zwan, 1978). Yet, finally some consensus emerged from this discussion that a 
policy of wage restraint was a suitable medicine against stagflation and would be 
helpful to enhance employment. This consensus resulted in the famous Wassenaar 
agreement between the social partners in 1982. This agreement, which couples wage 
restraint to working time reduction, is seen as the starting point of the improvement of 
the Dutch economy, with increased labour participation and a reduction of 
unemployment. It has become known as the transition from the ‘Dutch disease’ to the 
‘Dutch miracle’.     
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Yet, occasionally the policy of wage restraint, and restraint in government spending, is 
challenged again. This is especially true during periods of cyclical recessions. One of 
the arguments, most prominently put forward by Kleinknecht (1994, 2003), is that 
wage restraints lead to less investments in labour saving technical progress so that the 
growth rate of (labour) productivity decreases. The other side of the coin of this debate 
is that empirical evidence does not reveal a negative relationship between wage 
restraint and labour productivity growth, and that wage restraints lead to a higher rate 
of return on capital. These profits are partly used for investments in R&D which 
enhance total factor productivity and therefore (more than) compensate the adverse 
effect of wage restraints on labour productivity.      
 
Equilibrium modelling 
Another debate on modelling and the working of the economy was held around 1990. 
This time the debate was initiated outside the CPB, amongst other by experts at the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (see Van Bergeijk and Van Sinderen, 2000). Model 
outcomes of the CPB were becoming more and more “policy resistent”, i.e. the 
calculated effects of policy measures were small as compared to the large effects 
needed for restructuring the economy. The plea was to put more emphasis on the 
supply side of the economy, such as competition policy and deregulation, and use 
applied general equilibrium models for long term analysis of structural policy 
measures (see Don, Van de Klundert and Van Sinderen, 1991). This debate urged the 
CPB to construct a new model, the MIMIC-model, which has since then been used 
intensively to calculate the general equilibrium effects of policy measures with respect 
to taxation and social security reform. Moreover it initiated a shift in the research of 
the CPB toward cost benefit analysis and studies of the effects of institutional change.     
 
All in all these examples show that scientific debate has indeed influenced the ideas 
and more or less the consensus about the working of the economy in the institutional 
set up of policy preparation in the Netherlands. However, there is always the danger 
of, on the one hand, too much debate so that policy makers and politicians are tempted 
to cherry picking, and, on the other hand, too much path dependence in the scientific 
research programmes, so that paradigm changes are hindered.  
 
6 A comparison with France 
 
In order to illustrate that there are large differences between countries in the industrial 
organisation of economic policy preparation, this section compares labour market 
institutions and the organisation of policy preparation in France and the Netherlands. 
The Dutch polder model can be classified – if any classification is possible: see 
Esping-Andersen (1990) and the critics of this classification – as a mixture between 
the liberal Anglo-Saxon model and the social-Christian Rhineland model. The French 
model can be regarded as an example of the ‘latin rim’ or Mediterranean model, 
although much of the actual social security regulations in France mimic the Rhineland 
model. The reason for this focus on the differences between France and the 
Netherlands is that, as far as we know, no much literature on comparing these two 
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countries exists. Blanchard and Tirole (2004) discuss some institutional differences 
between these two countries with respect to employment protection. However, much 
more economic literature is available on the institutional differences between Germany 
and the Netherlands (see e.g. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 
1997; Blien and Den Butter, 2003). With respect to institutional differences (and 
similarities) between the UK and the Netherlands Nickell and Van Ours (2000) show 
how partly overlapping and partly different supply oriented policies resulted in a 
substantial reduction of unemployment rates in both of these countries. 
 
Policy institutions in France 
In order to compare with the Netherlands, we first have a closer look at institutions 
which play a role in the social dialogue and policy preparation in France. The French 
institutional organisations, which are regarded as the most influential on policy 
preparation are the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques 
(INSEE), the Direction de Prévision (DP), the Commisariat Général du Plan and the 
Conseil Economique et Social (CES).  
 
INSEE, DP and CGP 
The Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) and the 
Direction de Prévision (DP) conduct quantitative analyses of economic developments 
in France, which are used in the CES advices. Both institutes are closely related and 
ressort under the Ministry of Finance. The INSEE has the combined role of a bureau of 
statistics and of an institute of applied economic research. Besides data collection and 
its analysis the INSEE is actively involved in economic research and education. In 
addition to applied research, focused on policy making, the INSEE also conducts high 
quality fundamental research.  
 
Although both institutes are involved in economic forecasting, each institute has its 
own specific responsibilities. The DP focuses primarily on short-term forecasting for 
economic policy making concerning public finance, foreign relations and the financial 
sector. The INSEE specialises on the one hand in extremely short term forecasting and 
on the other hand on long term forecasting. In order to secure data collection 
independent of policy analysis, forecasting and analysis of policy proposals, which are 
relevant for actual policy making, are prepared by the DP, and not by the INSEE. 
  
A second construction to separate data collection and its analysis from policy 
preparation lies in the existence of the Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP). The CGP 
is a platform where the actual policy problems are discussed. The predictions and 
policy analyses of the DP and the INSEE serve as input for these discussions. During 
its existence the CGP status has been subordinate to that of the Ministry of Finance 
and depended heavily on the prestige of its members. Today the CGP has been 
abolished. 
 
An important feature of the French system are the close interrelations between the 
Ministry of Finance, the country’s most powerful economic body, and the INSEE, the 
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DP and the CGP. Staff members are often employed by one of those institutions 
through short term contracts, which result in frequent mutual rotations and increased 
interaction possibilities. In his study on the French financial elite, Kadushin (1995) 
demonstrates that board membership is heavily determined by social circle 
membership. Concentration of social economic power in France resides largely with 
the elite.  
 
Conseil Economique et Social 
In France the Conseil Economique et Social (CES) advices the parliament or the 
government on legislation with a social and economic character. In the CES a great 
variety of social organisations are represented, with the restriction that merely 
organisations seen as the most representative are eligible to CES membership. CES 
members include delegates from employee organisations, employer organisations, free 
professions, French citizens who live abroad and agricultural organisations.  
 
The CES functions as a discussion forum for the various organisations represented in 
it. In the CES information exchange takes place and assessments are made with respect 
to future policy. Every policy plan or project concerning social-economic legislation is 
liable to compulsory assessment by the CES. The French government may consult the 
CES on other policy matters as well if such advice seems appropriate. However, the 
government is not compelled to comply with CES advices and the influence of these 
advices seems to be rather limited. 163 of the 231 CES members are representatives 
appointed directly by the social member organisations, the government selects the 
remaining 68 members. Initially the purpose of this appointment procedure was to 
combine independence and representation with a converging force to serve the national 
interest (Frayssinet, 1986). Furthermore the government adds 72 specialised section 
members to the 231 CES members. Although section members do not enjoy the full 
CES membership they contribute to discussions in their discipline.  
 
Comparison of institutions in France and the Netherlands 
One of the most striking differences between the two countries is that France lacks an 
equivalent organisation for the Dutch Foundation of Labour (STAR). Unlike in the 
Netherlands, the French employers’ organisations and trade unions are not involved in 
negotiating collective labour agreements at a central level. This implies that in France 
no national coordination of wage bargaining exists. Central coordination in the 
Netherlands provoked effective cooperation and prevented important rivalry between 
the various unions, although they might have been founded around different 
ideological principles. The French situation without central coordination and the 
competitive system of CES representation encourages competition between the various 
union organisations.    
 
Although the Dutch SER and the French CES appear to have about the same role in 
the social dialogue in both countries, considerable differences surface. Within the CES 
many more stakeholder organisations and lobby groups have claimed representation 
than in the SER, where the social partners play a major role. Implicitly this results in a 
 27 
weaker voice for the French social partners in the CES and therefore less influence on 
government policy. The second related dissimilarity is that in the Netherlands the SER 
is institutionalised to be much more independent from government intervention than 
the CES in France. The Dutch government has no say in the appointment of SER 
members, whereas in France about one-third of the CES members and all of the 
section members are appointed by the government. The Dutch SER and the French 
CES differ also in the way they draft their policy recommendations. Whereas CES 
recommendations usually comprise a number of different views on policy issues and a 
count of the number of votes of how many members share each of these views, the 
SER tries hard to reach agreement on policy issues and come to unanimous 
recommendations. When unanimous agreement is not reached, disagreement is 
minimised and the text of the recommendations indicates by name which members 
have different opinions about specific aspects of the policy proposals.  
 
In principle the CPB in the Netherlands, and the INSEE, the DP and the CGP in 
France have about the same role in policy preparation. Within the INSEE data 
collection is made independent from data analysis, whereas in the Netherlands the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), which is nowadays placed at distance from 
government control, conducts independent data collection. Yet it seems that INSEE 
and DP analyses have far less influence on the French policy discussions than CPB 
analyses have on policy discussions in the Netherlands. 
 
A similarity in the institutional set-up of labour relations in both countries is that most 
collective labour agreements between the social partners are made binding by the 
government for all workers – union members and non-union members – in the sector 
to which the agreement applies. This is remarkable as in both countries the rate of 
union membership has fallen and is nowadays rather low. France even has the lowest 
membership rate of the European union (Besancenot and Vranceanu, 1998). 
Furthermore, the number of workers that is bound by collective agreements is very 
high in France, with coverage of about 90%. In the Netherlands 70 tot 75% of the 
workers is covered by collective agreements. 
 
All in all it can be concluded that the major differences between France and the 
Netherlands arise from the extent of government interference in labour relations. In the 
Netherlands the government has refrained more and more from interfering in the social 
partners’ negotiations on labour relations. Yet, the threat of possible interference has 
motivated the social partners to be co-operative and to avoid such interference. The 
need to co-operate enhances trust in the negotiation process (see the previous section). 
Traditionally in France much direct government intervention in the negotiations 
between the social partners can be found. This large governmental influence on the 
outcome of the negotiations causes distrust and enhanced feelings of powerlessness 
between the social partners. Whereas in the Netherlands social partners try hard to 
reach a compromise agreement within the set-up of the polder model, in France we 
see, what we may call, ‘the productive conflict model’ at work. In this model it is tried 
to resolve disputes by confrontation. This has also to do with the republican tradition 
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in France and the social-Colbertism with a dominant role for the centralised state, 
which tries to monopolise the power to make decisions in order to reach certain 
political and social goals. In France it is the political elite that decides about policy 
matters without much consultation. It will withdraw or adapt the policy measures when 
they evoke too much protest and lead to conflict. In the Netherlands, however, the 
institutional set-up is much more directed to consultation. The advantage of the Dutch 
model is that less costly conflicts arise. However, the disadvantage as compared to the 
French conflict model is that coming to an agreement may be very time consuming 
and that compromise policy measures may be inefficient (see e.g. the failing efforts in 
the Netherlands to come to a reform of the costly disability provisions). Subsequently 
in France obstacles lie with policy execution while in the Netherlands policy 
preparation is most time consuming. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
The process of policy preparation is organised in the Netherlands in such a way that 
scientific knowledge plays an important role in the shaping of (economic) policy. 
Moreover the formal and informal procedures of the institutional set-up guarantee that 
there is ample interaction and quality control in the use of scientific knowledge in the 
policy proposals. This interaction is favoured by the fact that there is a relative small 
number of key actors in the process of policy preparation and that they meet each other 
frequently in various committees, commissions and councils. It happens quite often, 
and probably more frequent than in other countries, that academic experts become high 
ranked government officers and even Ministers. There is also much mobility of experts 
between academia, planning bureau’s, advisory councils and think tanks at ministries.  
 
The consultation structure of the Dutch ‘polder model’ puts much emphasis on 
compromise in the social dialogue and on obtaining public support for policy 
measures. The advantage is that much social unrest is avoided and implementation 
costs of policy measures are relatively low. The disadvantage is that it may take a long 
time before agreement is reached on urgent policy measures and that policy 
arrangements, for instance the system of social security, become very complicated and 
inefficient as they are the result of extensively debated and amended compromise 
agreements.  
 
The separation between undisputed data collection, consensus on the working of the 
economy and compromise about policy goals, as inspired by Tinbergen, still seems to 
be a workable institutional set-up. A problem which becomes increasingly evident is 
that policy advices and the resulting policy debate more and more have a very 
technocratic character so that they are difficult to understand by the laymen. More in 
general this is an important information problem in highly developed societies. 
Apparently the trade-offs between risk insurance by the government and individual 
responsibilities of citizens, and between moral hazard and solidarity, are difficult to 
understand and communicate. It urges to rethink how more attention to communication 
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on the dilemma’s in policy making because of these trade-offs can be included in the 
institutional set-up of the polder model. 
  
In the industrial organisation of economic policy preparation there is no one model to 
be preferred. Different countries obtained different models which can partly be 
attributed to cultural differences. In the institutional set-up of policy preparation after 
WW II the concept of ´planning´ played a major role in most continental European 
countries. Yet, the decentralised, discussion based culture in the Netherlands and the 
centralised, power based culture in France gave rise to a much different interpretations 
of `planning`, and of the way the policy preparation was institutionalised. However, 
part of the differences can also be attributed to the way the protagonists and opinion 
leaders in economic policy were involved in the institutional set-up of policy 
preparation. The obvious examples are here Norway (see Bjerkholt, 1998) and the 
Netherlands, were both first Nobel price winners in economics, Frisch and Tinbergen, 
were the forerunners in making economic policy preparation empirical. In Norway 
policy plans were set up like production plans in industry, with much detail, whereas 
in the Netherlands policy analysis was much more macro oriented, with the separation 
of responsibilities between data collection, knowledge on the working of the economy 
and political preferences described extensively in this paper.      
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